**BETWEEN DOMINANCE AND INEQUALITY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS HIERARCHY IN WORLD POLITICS**

Fabrício H. CHAGAS-BASTOS

Social Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory (Saxelab)

Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

**APPENDIX A. Codebook & Variables List**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable Code |  | Variable |  |  |
| SDO |  | Social Dominance Orientation (and subscales) |  |  |
| FPPosture |  | Foreign Policy attitudes |  |  |
| SECS |  | Political Ideology |  |  |

**APPENDIX B. Demographic data**

**Table B1. Demographic data**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Study 1 (%) | Study 2 (%) | US 2020 Census |
| Gender (female) | 36.60 | 49.93 | 50.5 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Age* |  |  |  |
| 18-44 years | 78.71 | 66.32 | 35.60 |
| 45-64 years | 19.14 | 29.75 | 25.10 |
| 65 years > | 2.15 | 3.93 | 16.80 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Ethnicity* |  |  |  |
| White | 82.06 | 77.85 | 57.80 |
| African American | 6.94 | 9.57 | 12.10 |
| Hispanic or Latino | 4.31 | 3.93 | 18.70 |
| Asian | 5.43 | 6.03 | 5.90 |
| Native American | 1.12 | 1.31 | 0.70 |
| Other | 1.87 | 1.31 | 4.80 |
|  |  |  |  |
| *N* | 418 | 763 | - |

**Figure B1. Political orientation distribution across samples**

*Study 1*

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

*Study 2*

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

**APPENDIX C. Results for individual studies**

**Table C1. Correlational findings, Means, and Standard Deviations (Study 1)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | M (SD) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| 1. CI | 5.11 (1.09) | (.77) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2. MI | 4.40 (.87) | .35\*\*\* | (.49) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3. ISO | 4.31 (.97) | .05 | .11\* | (.58) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4. GJ | 4.81 (1.21) | .63\*\*\* | .30\*\*\* | .19\*\*\* | (.28) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5. SDO | 3.51 (1.07) | -.27\*\*\* | .21\*\*\* | .28\*\*\* | -.01 | (.84) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6. SDO-D | 4.23 (1.69) | .08 | .32\*\*\* | .45\*\*\* | .33\*\*\* | .84\*\*\* | (.95) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7. SDO-E | 2.79 (1.16) | -.61\*\*\* | -.08 | -.14\*\* | -.49\*\*\* | .61\*\*\* | .09 | (.88) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8. Age | 36.24 (10.94) | .08 | .11\* | -.10\* | .01 | -.09 | -.09 | -.04 | – |  |  |  |  |
| 9. Gender (male) | .63 (.48) | -.15\*\* | -.08 | -.03 | -.15\*\* | .03 | -.06 | .16\*\* | -.13\*\* | – |  |  |  |
| 10. Education | 5.81 (1.57) | -.08 | .12\* | .04 | .08 | .33\*\*\* | .33\*\*\* | .13\* | -.11\* | -.09 | – |  |  |
| 11. Income | 4.62 (1.52) | .13\*\* | .09 | .000 | .16\*\*\* | .03 | .08 | -.07 | .01 | -.02 | .25\*\*\* | – |  |
| 12. Conservatism | 61.89 (13.59) | .01 | .38\*\*\* | .30\*\*\* | .11\* | .43\*\*\* | .46\*\*\* | .12\* | .10\* | -.13\* | .20\*\*\* | .06 | (.83) |

Note. Gender = female (0); male (1); other (2). CI = Cooperative Internationalism; MI = Militant Internationalism; ISO = Isolationism; GJ = Global Justice; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; SDO-D = SDO-Dominance; SDO-E = SDO-Egalitarianism. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) in parenthesis.

**Table C2. Correlational findings, Means, and Standard Deviations (Study 2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | M (SD) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| 1. CI | 5.24 (1.19) | (.85) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2. MI | 4.14 (1.11) | -.09\*\* | (.76) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3. ISO | 4.26 (1.14) | -.37\*\*\* | -.19\*\*\* | (.77) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4. GJ | 4.47 (1.26) | .68\*\*\* | -.11\*\* | -.26\*\*\* | (.67) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5. SDO | 2.48 (1.27) | -.44\*\*\* | .41\*\*\* | .25\*\*\* | -.18\*\*\* | (.72) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6. SDO-D | 2.63 (1.66) | -.20\*\*\* | .39\*\*\* | .25\*\*\* | .06 | .90\*\*\* | (.96) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7. SDO-E | 2.33 (1.26) | -.62\*\*\* | .31\*\*\* | .17\*\*\* | -.44\*\*\* | .83\*\*\* | .50\*\*\* | (.93) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8. Age | 40.56 (12.29) | -.04 | .19\*\*\* | -.15\*\*\* | -.06 | .02 | -.04 | .08\* | – |  |  |  |  |
| 9. Gender (male) | .53 (.53) | -.09\*\* | .12\*\* | .000 | -.04 | .14\*\*\* | .13\*\*\* | .11\*\* | -.05 | – |  |  |  |
| 10. Education | 5.31 (2.06) | .15\*\*\* | .01 | -.08\* | .18\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | .19\*\*\* | .06 | .000 | .09\* | – |  |  |
| 11. Income | 4.65 (1.82) | -.03 | .07\* | -.08\* | -.07 | .07 | .02 | .11\*\* | -.05 | .06 | .37\*\*\* | – |  |
| 12. Conservatism | 54.77 (19.36) | -.41\*\*\* | .51\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | -.31\*\*\* | .56\*\*\* | .45\*\*\* | .53\*\*\* | .20\*\*\* | .03 | -.02 | .08\* | (.90) |

Note. Gender = female (0); male (1); other (2). CI = Cooperative Internationalism; MI = Militant Internationalism; ISO = Isolationism; GJ = Global Justice; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; SDO-D = SDO-Dominance; SDO-E = SDO-Egalitarianism. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) in parenthesis.

**Table C3. OLS models for SDO predicting foreign policy attitudes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Study 1 | | | | | | | |  | Study 2 | | | | | | | |
|  | CI | | MI | | ISO | | GJ | |  | CI | | MI | | ISO | | GJ | |
| Models | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |  | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
| SDO | -.27\*\*\* | -.30\*\*\* | .21\*\*\* | .07 | .28\*\*\* | .19\*\*\* | -.01 | -.07 |  | -.44\*\*\* | -.35\*\*\* | .41\*\*\* | .18\*\*\* | .25\*\*\* | .25\*\*\* | -.18\*\*\* | -.06 |
| Age |  | .02 |  | .08 |  | -.12\* |  | -.02 |  |  | .000 |  | .11\*\*\* |  | -.17\*\*\* |  | -.02 |
| Gender (male) |  | -.12\* |  | -.02 |  | -.03 |  | -.13\* |  |  | -.06 |  | .08\*\* |  | -.03 |  | -.04 |
| Education |  | -.05 |  | .02 |  | -.09 |  | .03 |  |  | .23\*\*\* |  | -.04 |  | -.08\* |  | .23\*\*\* |
| Income |  | .14\*\* |  | .06 |  | .000 |  | .15\*\* |  |  | -.08\* |  | .04 |  | -.07\* |  | -.12\*\*\* |
| Conservatism |  | .12\* |  | .33\*\*\* |  | .24\*\*\* |  | .11\* |  |  | -.21\*\*\* |  | .38\*\*\* |  | .05 |  | -.25\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R2* | .07 | .12 | .05 | .16 | .08 | .14 | .000 | .06 |  | .19 | .28 | .17 | .31 | .06 | .11 | .03 | .14 |
| Adjusted *R2* | .07 | .11 | .04 | .15 | .08 | .12 | -.002 | .04 |  | .19 | .28 | .17 | .30 | .06 | .10 | .03 | .14 |

Note. Gender = female (0); male (1); other (2). All variable values represent standardised coefficients (*β*). \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

**Table C4. OLS models for SDO (subscales) predicting foreign policy attitudes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Study 1 | | | | | | | |  | Study 2 | | | | | | | |
|  | CI | | MI | | ISO | | GJ | |  | CI | | MI | | ISO | | GJ | |
| Models | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | (23) | (24) |  | (25) | (26) | (27) | (28) | (29) | (30) | (31) | (32) |
| SDO-D | .14\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | .33\*\*\* | .21\*\*\* | .47\*\*\* | .42\*\*\* | .38\*\*\* | .37\*\*\* |  | .14\*\*\* | .16\*\*\* | .31\*\*\* | .23\*\*\* | .22\*\*\* | .21\*\*\* | .37\*\*\* | .39\*\*\* |
| SDO-E | -.62\*\*\* | -.60\*\*\* | -.12\* | -.14\*\* | -.18\*\*\* | -.20\*\*\* | -.53\*\*\* | -.51\*\*\* |  | -.69\*\*\* | -.62\*\*\* | .15\*\*\* | -.04 | .06 | .07 | -.63\*\*\* | -.54\*\*\* |
| Age |  | .05 |  | .10\* |  | -.10\* |  | .02 |  |  | .04 |  | .12\*\*\* |  | -.16\*\*\* |  | .03 |
| Gender (male) |  | -.04 |  | .01 |  | .02 |  | -.04 |  |  | -.05 |  | .09\*\* |  | -.03 |  | -.03 |
| Education |  | -.08 |  | .01 |  | -.11\* |  | .000 |  |  | .16\*\*\* |  | -.06 |  | -.09\* |  | .15\*\*\* |
| Income |  | .09\* |  | .04 |  | -.03 |  | .10\* |  |  | -.01 |  | .06 |  | -.07 |  | -.05 |
| Conservatism |  | .01 |  | .29\*\*\* |  | .17\*\*\* |  | -.01 |  |  | -.16\*\*\* |  | .40\*\*\* |  | .05 |  | -.20\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R2* | .39 | .41 | .12 | .20 | .24 | .27 | .39 | .40 |  | .40 | .44 | .17 | .32 | .07 | .11 | .30 | .35 |
| Adjusted *R2* | .39 | .40 | .11 | .19 | .23 | .26 | .38 | .39 |  | .40 | .44 | .17 | .31 | .06 | .10 | .30 | .34 |

Note. Gender = female (0); male (1); other (2). All variable values represent standardised coefficients (*β*). \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

**APPENDIX D. Meta-analytical results**

**Table D1. Meta-analyses of OLS models for SDO predicting foreign policy attitudes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CI | | | |  | MI | | | |  | ISO | | | |  | GJ | | | |
|  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |
| SDO | -.27\*\*\* | -.31 | -.22 | -11.20 |  | .12\*\*\* | .07 | .17 | 4.83 |  | .19\*\*\* | .13 | .24 | 6.95 |  | -.05 | -.11 | .000 | -1.94 |
| Age | .000 | -.05 | .05 | .14 |  | .10\*\*\* | .05 | .15 | 4.01 |  | -.15\*\*\* | -.20 | -.09 | -5.41 |  | -.02 | -.07 | .04 | -.66 |
| Gender (male) | -.07\*\* | -.12 | -.02 | -2.91 |  | .05\* | .000 | .10 | 2.04 |  | -.03 | -.08 | .02 | -1.10 |  | -.06\* | -.12 | -.01 | -2.36 |
| Education | .14\*\*\* | .09 | .18 | 5.40 |  | -.02 | -.07 | .03 | -.72 |  | -.08\*\* | -.13 | -.02 | -2.81 |  | .15\*\*\* | .10 | .20 | 5.71 |
| Income | -.01 | -.06 | .04 | -.25 |  | .04 | .000 | .09 | 1.79 |  | -.04 | -.10 | .01 | -1.58 |  | -.03 | -.08 | .02 | -1.07 |
| Conservatism | -.08\*\*\* | -.13 | -.03 | -3.29 |  | .30\*\*\* | .26 | .34 | 12.78 |  | .10\*\*\* | .05 | .16 | 3.87 |  | -.10\*\*\* | -.16 | -.05 | -3.86 |

Note. M*r* = weighted mean semi-partial correlation. CI L = lower confidence interval. CI U = upper confidence interval. \* p < .05. \*\* p < .01

**Table D2. Meta-analyses of OLS models for SDO subscales predicting foreign policy attitudes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CI | | | |  | MI | | | |  | ISO | | | |  | GJ | | | |
|  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |  | M*r* | CI L | CI U | Combined *Z* |
| SDO-D | .13\*\*\* | .08 | .17 | 5.77 |  | .18\*\*\* | .14 | .23 | 7.56 |  | .25\*\*\* | .20 | .29 | 9.87 |  | .31\*\*\* | .27 | .35 | 14.41 |
| SDO-E | -.52\*\*\* | -.55 | -.49 | -29.56 |  | -.06\*\* | -.11 | -.02 | -2.59 |  | -.05 | -.10 | .000 | -1.80 |  | -.45\*\*\* | -.48 | -.42 | -22.76 |
| Age | .04 | .000 | .09 | 1.95 |  | .11\*\*\* | .06 | .16 | 4.56 |  | -.13\*\*\* | -.18 | -.08 | -5.00 |  | .02 | -.02 | .07 | 1.07 |
| Gender (male) | -.05\* | -.09 | .000 | -2.17 |  | .06\* | .01 | .11 | 2.45 |  | -.01 | -.06 | .04 | -.31 |  | -.03 | -.08 | .01 | -1.49 |
| Education | .07\*\*\* | .03 | .12 | 3.34 |  | -.03 | -.08 | .02 | -1.35 |  | -.09\*\*\* | -.14 | -.04 | -3.33 |  | .09\*\*\* | .04 | .13 | 3.77 |
| Income | .02 | -.02 | .07 | 1.10 |  | .05\* | .000 | .10 | 2.07 |  | -.05 | -.10 | .000 | -1.80 |  | .01 | -.04 | .05 | .26 |
| Conservatism | -.08\*\*\* | -.12 | -.04 | -3.70 |  | .29\*\*\* | .25 | .34 | 12.64 |  | .08\*\* | .03 | .14 | 3.22 |  | -.10\*\*\* | -.15 | -.06 | -4.40 |

Note. M*r* = weighted mean semi-partial correlation. CI L = lower confidence interval. CI U = upper confidence interval. \* p < .05. \*\* p < .01

**APPENDIX E. Question wording for measurements**

**16-ITEM SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION SCALE**

(Ho et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994)

[Display] Please indicate your reaction to each of the items below from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.
10. Group equality should be our ideal.
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
13. Increased social equality.
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.
16. No one group should dominate in society.

Items 1-8 form the SDO-D subscale.

Items 9-16 are reverse scored and form the SDO-E subscale.

**FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES**

Participants will rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement using a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 7 = *strongly agree*). To mitigate survey response effects, the 19 items will be presented to participants in random order.

[Display] Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement.

(Kertzer et al., 2014)

Cooperative internationalism

1. [Country] needs to cooperate more with the United Nations.
2. It is essential for [Country] to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.
3. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries is of utmost importance.
4. Helping to improve the standard of living is less developed countries is of utmost importance.
5. Protecting the global environment is of utmost importance.

Militant internationalism

1. [Country] should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power
2. Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power.
3. Going to war is unfortunate but sometimes the only solution to international problems.
4. ~~[Country] military strength is not the best way to ensure world peace. (Reverse-coded)~~
5. [Country] must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.

Isolationism

1. [Country] should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.
2. We should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems.
3. [Country] needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world. (Reverse-coded)
4. [Country]’s conception of its leadership role in the world must be scaled down.
5. Our allies are perfectly capable of defending themselves and they can afford it, thus allowing [Country] to focus on internal rather than external threats to its well-being.

(Gravelle et al., 2017)

Global Justice

1. [Country] should be more willing to share its wealth with other nations, even if it doesn’t coincide with our political interests.
2. [Country] should spend significantly more money on foreign aid.
3. [Country] already does enough to help the world’s poor.
4. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in [Country]’s foreign policy. (Reverse-coded)

**12 ITEM SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM SCALE (SECS)**

(Everett, 2013)

[Display] Please indicate the extent to which you feel positive or negative towards each issue. Scores of 0 indicate greater negativity, and scores of 100 indicate greater positivity. Scores of 50 indicate that you feel neutral about the issue.

1. Abortion (reverse scored) (S)
2. Limited government (E)
3. Military and national security (S)
4. Religion (S)
5. Welfare benefits (reverse scored) (E)
6. Gun ownership (E)
7. Traditional marriage (S)
8. Traditional values (S)
9. Fiscal responsibility (E)
10. Business (E)
11. The family unit (S)
12. Patriotism (S)

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